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Laidley: The Filing of an Indictment against a Criminal Defendant Activate

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Speedy Trial-The Filing of an
Indictment Against a Criminal Defendant Activates His
Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial,
Notwithstanding the Fact that the Defendant Had No
Knowledge of the Indictment Until the Time of
His Arrest.
Doggett v. United States,
-

U.S.

-,

112 S. Ct. 2686, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992).

On February 22, 1980, Marc Doggett was indicted for conspiring to import and distribute cocaine in violation of federal law.' However, before the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) could secure his arrest, Doggett
fled the United States to South America.' In September of 1981, the DEA
discovered that the Panamanian government had imprisoned Doggett and
was holding him pending trial on drug charges.' Doggett was released by
the Panamanian government and unbeknownst to customs authorities or the
DEA, reentered the United States on September 25, 1983, resuming a normal life. 4 For over five years after Doggett's return to the United States, the
1. Doggett v. United States, - U.S.....-, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2689, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 525
(1992). Marc Doggett, Petitioner, was indicted for conspiring to import cocaine in violation of
21 U.S.C. Section 963 and for conspiring to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section
846. United States v. Doggett, 906 F.2d 573, 575 (1lth Cir. 1990), cert. granted,- U.S. -,
111 S. Ct. 1070, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1176 (1991). A warrant for Doggett's arrest was issued on the
same day he was indicted. Id. The DEA informed the United States Marshal's Service that
the DEA would coordinate Doggett's arrest. Id.
2. Doggett, - U.S. at -_,112 S. Ct. at 2689, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 526. In March of 1980,
two law enforcement officers, on orders from the DEA Administrative Agent assigned to the
case, attempted to arrest Doggett at his parents' home. Id. Doggett's mother informed the
officers that her son had left for Colombia four days prior to the attempted arrest. Id. In
hopes of apprehending Doggett upon his return to the country, the DEA alerted all United
States Customs stations via the Treasury Enforcement Communications System that Doggett
was wanted by the DEA. Id.
3. Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2689, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 526. The DEA initiated
informal expulsion proceedings which had been used by the DEA previously in similar situations, believing that efforts to formally extradite Doggett would be to no avail given the nature
of Doggett's crimes in Panama. Doggett, 906 F.2d at 576. Despite the fact that Panamanian
authorities agreed to return Doggett to the United States once he had been prosecuted in
Panama, Doggett was released from Panamanian custody and was allowed to travel to Colombia. Id.
4. Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2689, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 526-27. Between 1982 and
1988 Doggett lived openly in Virginia, using his real name. Id. He married, graduated from
college, obtained gainful employment, registered to vote, obtained a driver's license, took out
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DEA operated under the assumption that he remained incarcerated in Panama.5 Eventually, the United States Marshal's Service located Doggett
through a routine credit check on individuals with outstanding arrest warrants. 6 On September 5, 1988, eight and one-half years after his indictment,
Doggett was finally arrested. 7
Before a federal magistrate, Doggett moved to dismiss the indictment,
contending that the delay of eight and one-half years in his prosecution violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.' On the federal magistrate's recommendation, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida denied the motion, holding that the delay had not impaired Doggett's ability to present a successful defense. 9 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, reiterating that
Doggett was required to prove actual prejudice to his defense in order to
receive relief via a speedy trial claim.' 0 Doggett then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari." Held-Reversed. The filing of an indictment against a defendant activates his Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant has no

mortgages on two homes, possessed credit cards, and filed income tax returns. Doggett, 906
F.2d at 577.
5. Doggett, - U.S. at -_, 112 S. Ct. at 2689, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 527. The American Embassy in Panama had sent information regarding Doggett's status to the United States State
Department upon Doggett's release, but the DEA never received that information. Id.
6. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2689-90, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 527 (1992). The credit check was
issued pursuant to WANT II, a service of the United States Marshal's office verifying whether
or not outstanding warrants have been served. Doggett, 906 F.2d at 577.
7. Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2690, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 527.
8. Id. at -,112 S. Ct. at 2690, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 527.
9. Id. The district court took the recommendation of the Federal Magistrate who heard
Doggett's motion. Id. The Magistrate applied a four-prong test set out in Barker v. Wingo to
assist courts in assessing speedy trial claims. Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2690-91, 120
L. Ed. 2d at 527-28 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 467 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). The four prongs of the
Barker test include: "length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. The Magistrate determined that, although Doggett's case satisfied the first three prongs of the test, he failed to
prove any particular prejudice to his defense and, as such, Doggett's speedy trial claim could
not stand. Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. 2690, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 527. Doggett then entered
a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal on speedy trial grounds. Id.
10. United States v. Doggett, 906 F.2d 573, 582 (1 1th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, - U.S.
II IlS. Ct. 1070, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1176 (1991). The Court of Appeals determined that in order
for Doggett to prevail on his speedy trial claim, he had to either establish actual prejudice to
his defense or establish that the first three prongs of the test weighed so heavily in his favor as
to preclude consideration of the fourth prong. Id. at 579. The court concluded that Doggett
failed to establish either one of these criteria. Id. at 582.
11. Doggett v. United States, - U.S .....
IlI S. Ct. 1070, 1070, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1176,
1176 (1991).
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knowledge of the indictment until his arrest. 12
The right to a speedy trial has its roots in the early English common
law. 13 The earliest significant expressions of the right to a speedy trial are
found in the Assize of Clarendon of 116614 and the Magna Charta of 1215.15
The first specific recognition of the right to a speedy trial in the United
States appeared in the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776.16 In 1791, the

12. Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2694, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 532.

13. See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 314 n.5-6 (1971) (tracing historical
background of speedy trial guarantee); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-26 (1967)
(Chief Justice Warren commenting extensively on historical underpinnings of right to speedy
trial); United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 197 n.6 (D. Md.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 857 (1955)
(analyzing British impact on Bill of Rights focusing on right to speedy trial); see also Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679, reprinted in 1 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 124-25 (2d series 1982). The Habeas Corpus Act afforded

"more speedy relief of all persons imprisoned for any.., criminal or supposed criminal matters." Id. at 125. Principally, the Act created a definite speedy trial right for those "committed for high treason or felony." Id. at 128. See generally THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 111-12 (5th ed. 1956) (describing evolution of
speedy trial right in English common law history); Z. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 1-2 (London, MacMillan 1883) (describing development of right to speedy trial through English legal history); Natalia Nicolaidis, The Sixth
Amendment Right to a Speedy and Public Trial, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1489, 1489-92 (1989)
(describing British background of right to speedy trial).
14. See Assize of Clarendon, 12 Hen. 2, ch. 4 (1166), reprinted in THEODORE F.T.
PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 113 (5th ed. 1956). The Assize of
Clarendon provided:
When a robber, murderer, thief, or receiver of such is captured ...
,the sheriff shall send
to the nearest justice (if there are no justices shortly visiting the country wherein he was
captured) by an intelligent man saying that he has captured so many men. And the justices shall reply telling the sheriff where the prisoners are to be brought before them. And
the sheriff shall bring them before the justices together with [local representatives] to
bring the record ... as to why they were captured; and there they shall make their law
before the justices.
Id.
15. See Magna Charta, ch. 40 (1215), quoted in I FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERIC W.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 172 (2d ed. 1911) (tracing development of English common law). A rough form of the right to a speedy trial was included in the Magna

Charta's catalogue of royal concessions: "To none will we sell, to none will we deny, to none
will we delay right or justice." Provoo, 17 F.R.D. at 196.
16. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 314 n.6 (noting that Article 8 of Virginia Declaration of
Rights "may have been the model Madison used for the Sixth Amendment"); Klopfer, 386
U.S. at 225 (noting fundamentality of Speedy Trial Clause); Provoo, 17 F.R.D. at 197 n.6
(noting that Article 8 of Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted from British Habeas
Corpus Act). The Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, Article 8 "secured the right to a
speedy trial in 'criminal prosecutions' where 'a man hath a right to demand the cause and
nature of his accusation.'" Marion, 404 U.S. at 314-15 n.6. Following the Revolutionary
War, a similar provision appeared in the constitutions of several states, including Delaware,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Massachusetts. DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; PA. CONST. art. I, § 9;
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XI; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also 10 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER,
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United States adopted the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, which protects criminal defendants, inter alia, from undue post-accusation delay by
providing that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial .... 17 In the 1967 decision of Klopfer v. North
8 the United States Supreme Court held that the right to a speedy
Carolina,"
trial is as fundamental as any other right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.' 9 The Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the Speedy Trail

SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

49 (1979) (describing

important role various colonial constitutions played in development of Bill of Rights); Dan
Donovan et al., Speedy Trials. An Overview of the ConstitutionalRight and the Federal and
Texas Statutes, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1979) (explaining development of Speedy
Trial Clause); Gregory P.N. Joseph, Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 611, 613 (1980) (recognizing state constitutions replicating Sixth Amendment speedy
trial language).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The amendment reads as follows:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense.
Id.; see, e.g., Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 222 (stating that right to speedy trial guaranteed by United
States Constitution); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 126 (1966) (describing Constitution
as bulwark for right to speedy trial); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957) (stating
that Sixth Amendment guarantees right to speedy trial); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 86
(1905) (stating that Constitution preserves each criminal defendant's right to speedy trial);
Dan Donovan et al., Speedy Trials: An Overview of the ConstitutionalRight and the Federal
and Texas Statutes, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1979) (surveying history of Speedy
Trial Clause); Alan N. Schneider, Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476,
477 (1968) (describing historical underpinnings of Speedy Trial Clause). The constitutional
right to a speedy trial has also been augmented through statutes. See Federal Speedy Trial Act
of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161-74 (1988) (establishing procedures and time limits between arrest
indictment and trial, and permissible delays within each period); FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) (empowering courts to dismiss indictments for unnecessary government delay); FED R. CRIM. P.
50(b) (mandating prompt disposition of cases at district court level).
18. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
19. Id. at 223 (establishing speedy trial right to be fundamental given its foundations in
traditional English jurisprudence); see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972) (noting
that right to speedy trial is guaranteed by Constitution). Defendant had the right to be tried
"in accordance with the protection of the... Sixth Amendment and that guarantee.., is to be
enforced against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards
that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment." Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 222
(quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965)); see also Nancy N. Kerr, Note, 14 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 113, 114 (1982) (giving general discussion of historical background of Speedy
Trial Clause); Alan N. Schneider, Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476,
483 (1968) (discussing history of right to speedy trial). All but three states have established
parallel provisions in their constitutions. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 7; ALASKA CONST.
art. I,

§

11; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2,

COLO. CONST.

art. II, § 16;

§

24; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 10; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15;
art. 1, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST.

CONN. CONST.
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Clause is to prevent undue and oppressive pre-trial incarceration, 20 to limit
the anxiety accompanying public accusation, 2 1 and to diminish delays that
might cripple a defendant's ability to prepare an adequate defense. 22 In ad-

art. 1, § 6; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, $ 11; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 14; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 13;
ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12; IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 10; KAN. BILL OF
RIGHTS § 10; Ky. CONST. § 11; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 16; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6; MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 21; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XI; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 20; MINN.
CONST. art. 1, § 6; Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 26; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 18(a); MONT. CONST. art.
II, § 24; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 14; N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 10; N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 14; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. 2,
§ 20; OR. CONST. art. I, § 10; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 10; S.C. CONST. art.
I, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 10; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 12; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. § 10; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. 1,
§ 22 & amend. 10; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 14; Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 7; WYO. CONsT. art. 1,
§ 10. The three states without state constitutional speedy trial provisions are Nevada, New
York, and North Carolina; each confers statutory speedy trial rights upon defendants; North
Carolina recognizes an unwritten but fundamental right to a speedy trial which is construed in
accordance with federal constitutional standards. State v. Wright, 224 S.E.2d 624, 627 (N.C.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977).
20. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (noting that time in jail may cause loss of job and disruption of family life); Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 (describing prevention of lengthy incarceration as
major purpose of speedy trial guarantee); Ewell, 383 U.S. at 120 (establishing prevention or
lengthy incarceration as purpose of Speedy Trial Clause); Gary A. Winters, Project, Preliminary Proceedings-Speedy Trial, 79 GEO. L.J. 591, 864-79 (1991) (noting Speedy Trial Clause
implemented to prevent lengthy incarceration); Daniel Brown, Note, Meshell v. State: The
Death of Texas Speedy Trial?, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 345 (1989) (discussing prevention of
lengthy incarceration as one purpose of speedy trial guarantee).
21. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Even if an accused is not incarcerated, his liberty may be
hampered by "living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and even hostility." Id. at 533; see
also Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 (noting effects of public accusation on defendant). The Marion
court reasoned, "[a]rrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain financial
resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his
family and his friends." Id.; see also Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 222 (discussing anxiety experienced
by defendants while waiting for trial). Imprisonment is not the only way in which a defendant's liberty may be restricted. Id. at 221-22. The pending indictment may subject him to
"public scorn and deprive him of employment and almost certainly will force curtailment of
his speech, associations and participation in unpopular causes." Id. at 222; see also Daniel
Brown, Note, Meshell v. State: The Death of Texas Speedy Trial?, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 341,
344 (1989) (noting significance of fact that speedy trial right applies to those who are not
incarcerated as well as to those who are); Alan N. Schneider, Note, The Right to a Speed Trial,
20 STAN. L. REV. 476, 476 (1968) (describing purposes of speedy trial guarantee).
22. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (discussing prejudice to defense as major concern of
Speedy Trial Clause). The possibility of the accused's defense being impaired through dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence is the most serious concern of the Speedy
Trial Clause because "the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system." Id.; see also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 42 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (noting importance of Speedy Trial Clause in protecting against prejudice to
defense). Delay could possibly result in the death or disappearance of key witnesses, and the
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dition to protecting the accused, the Speedy Trial Clause also protects certain societal interests, such as the desire to reduce the possibility that the
accused will commit further crimes.2 3 The interests protected by the speedy

trial guarantee are so fundamental that, if a defendant is denied his right to a
speedy trial, the Court has stipulated that dismissal of charges is the only
possible remedy.24
Although the Supreme Court had established who was eligible for protection under the Speedy Trial Clause, it was not until the case of Barker v.
Wingo 25 that the Court outlined exactly what constitutes a violation of the
right.2 6 However, instead of establishing a bright line standard to demarcate

veracity of available witnesses may be called into question due to memory loss over the lapse of
time. Id. ContraMarion, 404 U.S. at 322 (noting that protecting against prejudice to defense is
not major concern of Speedy Trial Clause). The court acknowledged that prejudice to the
defendant's case is a concern of the speedy trial guarantee, but insisted that the "possibility of
prejudice at trial is not itself sufficient reason to wrench the Sixth Amendment from its proper
context." Id.; see also Gary A. Winters, Project, Preliminary Proceedings-Speedy Trial, 79
GEO. L.J. 591, 866 (1991) (describing prejudice to defense as one purpose of speedy trial guarantee); Daniel Brown, Note, Meshell v. State: The Death of Texas Speedy Trial?, 41 BAYLOR
L. REV. 341, 351-53 (1989) (describing prejudice to defense as perhaps most important concern of Speedy Trial Clause).
23. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 437 (1973) (stating that public interest in
broad sense, as well as Constitution, demands prompt disposition of criminal charges). Persons released on bail have opportunity to commit other crimes, and those that remain in jail
have an increased temptation to escape as the pre-trial delay increases. Barker, 407 U.S. at
519; see also Dickey, 398 U.S. at 42 (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that lengthy pre-trial
delays result in clogged dockets and increased opportunity for defendants to plea bargain or
commit further crimes); John C. Godbold, Speedy Trial - MajorSurgeryfor A NationalIll, 24
ALA. L. REV. 265, 266 (1972) (stating that public safety is at issue when defendants released
on bond are subject to lengthy pre-trial delay); Daniel Brown, Note, Meshell v. State: The
Death of Texas Speedy Trial?, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 344-346 (1989) (describing societal
interests in speedy disposition of trials).
24. Strunk, 412 U.S. at 439-40 (holding dismissal of charge was only possible remedy for
denying defendant speedy trial); Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 (stating only remedy for denial of
right to speedy trial is absolute dismissal of indictment). The Court has noted that dismissal is
a serious consequence because it means that a defendant who may be guilty will go free, without having been tried. Id. Dismissal is more serious than application of an exclusionary rule
or reversal for new trial, but according to Barker it is the only remedy. Sam H. Clinton,
Speedy Trial-Texas Style, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 715-16 (1981); see also Gary A. Winters,
Project, Preliminary Proceedings-Speedy Trial, 79 GEO. L.J. 591, 864-79 (1991) (discussing
dismissal as sole recourse for violation of speedy trial right); Nancy N. Kerr, Note, 14 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 113, 114 (1982) (stating that dismissal is only remedy available for speedy trial
violations).
25. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
26. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S 30, 40-41 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating
that parameters of right to speedy trial had yet to be defined). Prior to 1971, the Supreme
Court had acknowledged the right to a speedy trial, defined its purpose, established when it
applied, and determined to whom it applied; however, the Court had not established any specific guidelines as to how the right should be analyzed. See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404
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the period within which the defendant's trial must be held, the Court in
Barker created a balancing test which requires courts to weigh several factors on an ad hoc basis in order to determine whether an individual's speedy
trial right has been violated.
According to the Barker test, the court
should assess the length of the delay,2" the reason for the delay,2 9 whether

U.S. 307, 318 (1971) (defining when right was triggered); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213, 223 (1967) (declaring right to be fundamental); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120
(1966) (establishing major concerns of right to speedy trial); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77,
86 (1905) (recognizing right to speedy trial guaranteed by Constitution); see also H. Richard
Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1376
(1972) (noting that Barker was first attempt Supreme Court made to supply uniformity to
speedy trial analysis); F.D. Lake, Jr., Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L.
REV. 1587, 1588 (1965) (discussing lack of guidance courts had in assessing speedy trial
claims).
27. Barker, 407 U.S at 530. The right to a speedy trial cannot turn on a specified number
of days; rather, the issue requires careful balancing of several issues. Id.; see also United States
v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 921-22 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that various factors should be balanced in determining if defendant's right to speedy trial was violated), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
980 (1986); United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850, 856 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that every
speedy trial issue should be analyzed using the Barker test); United States v. Carreon, 626 F.2d
528, 534 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that Barker test entails balancing of several factors to determine speedy trial violation); Hill v. Wainwright, 617 F.2d 375, 377 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that
Barker test requires balancing several relevant factors in light of each speedy trial claim);
United States v. Netterville, 553 F.2d 903, 913 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that in determining
whether speedy trial right was violated, courts must give attention to various factors), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1978); Gregory P.N. Joseph, Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48
FORDHAM L. REVIEW 611, 617 (1980) (opining that Barker test did not establish bright line
standard); H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM.
L. REV. 1376, 1389-91 (1972) (arguing that Barker Court rejected rigid rule in favor of balancing test in order to determine speedy trial violation).
28. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. The Court established that the length of the delay must be
presumptively prejudicial before an investigation of the other three factors takes place. Id.; see
also Terry v. Duckworth, 715 F.2d 1217, 1219 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that Barker balancing
test is not triggered until delay in bringing defendant to trial becomes presumptively prejudicial; only at that point must court balance all Barker factors). Generally, a delay in excess of
one year is considered presumptively prejudicial. See, e.g., Ringstaff v. Howard, 885 F.2d
1542, 1543 (11 th Cir. 1989) (holding 23-month delay between arrest and trial presumptively
prejudicial), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990); Government of Virgin Islands v. Pemberton,
813 F.2d 626, 628 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding 16-month delay sufficient to trigger Barker analysis);
Redd v. Sowders, 809 F.2d 1266, 1269 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that 32-month delay triggered
Barker analysis); United States v. Richards, 707 F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that
35-month delay triggered analysis of other Barker factors); United States v. DiFrancesco, 604
F.2d 769, 776-77 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding 30-month delay presumptively prejudicial); United
States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir.) (finding 21-month lapse sufficient to trigger
Barker analysis), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978); United States v. Michaud, 590 A.2d 538,
540 (Me. 1991) (holding that lapse of 32 months from indictment to trial raised presumption of
prejudice); Dan Donovan et al., Speedy Trials: An Overview of the ConstitutionalRight and the
Federal and Texas Statutes, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1043, 1049 (1979) (describing length of
delay as important element of Barker test); H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial
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and how the defendant has asserted his speedy trial right,3" and the amount
of prejudice the defendant has incurred due to the delay.3 "

Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1384 (1972) (discussing length of delay as
triggering factor of Barker analysis).
29. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Delays intended to gain tactical advantage over the defendant weigh more heavily against the Government than prosecutorial negligence and crowded
court dockets. Id.; see also United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that Government negligence should be factor in Barker analysis, although it should be
weighed less heavily than deliberate delays), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 (1978). Compare
United States v. Lara, 520 F.2d 460, 464-65 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (weighing Government's use of
delay to "court shop" heavily in defendant's favor) and Arrant v. Wainwright, 468 F.2d 677,
682 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding delay by Government used to convince witnesses to change testimony strongly prejudicial against Government), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973) with Davis v.
Puckett, 857 F.2d 1035, 1040-41 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that shortage of prosecutorial staff
and court's limited time should not weigh heavily against Government) and Government of
Virgin Islands v. Burmingham, 788 F.2d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that delay due to
crowded court dockets is not weighed strongly against Government). The Government will
not be held responsible at all for delays resulting from defendant's own actions. Barker, 407
U.S. at 530; see also United States v. Carter, 603 F.2d 1204, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding
16-month delay not deprivation of defendant's right to speedy trial where reason for delay was
defendant's deliberate disappearance); United States v. Redmond, 546 F.2d 1386, 1388-89
(10th Cir.) (finding no denial of speedy trial when delay was result of defendant being incarcerated in different country), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1977); United States v. Weber, 479 F.2d
331, 332-33 (8th Cir. 1973) (finding no denial of defendant's right to speedy trial where delay
was directly caused by defendant being fugitive from justice); ROBERT L. MISNER, SPEEDY
TRIAL-FEDERAL AND STATE PRACTICE 19 (1983) (reasoning that reason for delay factor of
the Barker test is highly fact specific); H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets
a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1385-87 (1972) (discussing various reasons for delay
to be used in Barker analysis).
30. Barker, 407 U.S. at 529-31. The Court reasoned that it would not find a valid waiver
of the speedy trial right unless it was voluntarily and consciously made. Id. While the accused
is not required to demand his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, failure to assert the
right can make proof of waiver difficult. Id.; see also United States v. Vachon, 869 F.2d 653,
657 (1st Cir. 1989) (weighing against defendant fact that he waited until 2 days prior to trial to
assert right to speedy trial after 13-month delay); Garcia Montalvo v. United States, 862 F.2d
425, 426 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that failure of defendant to asserts right after delay of six
years weighed against him); Bell v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 1085, 1094 (5th Cir.) (finding no speedy
trial violation where defendant failed to assert right during eight-year delay), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 933 (1987); United States v. Maizumi 526 F.2d 848, 851 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that
defendant's failure to assert right during delay undercut speedy trial contentions); ROBERT L.
MISNER, SPEEDY TRIAL-FEDERAL AND STATE PRACTICE

19-20 (1983) (stating defendant's

failure to claim right to speedy trial weighs against him per Barker test); Dan Donovan et al.,
Speedy Trials: An Overview of the ConstitutionalRight and the Federaland Texas Statutes, 10
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1043, 1054-55 (1979) (discussing defendant's assertion of right to speedy
trial as factor in Barker analysis).
31. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. The Barker Court held that in order for a speedy trial claim
to withstand inquiry, the defendant must show actual prejudice to his defense. Id. However, a
subsequent decision by the Court determined that a showing of merely potential prejudice
would withstand the scrutiny of the Barker test. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973).
Nevertheless, most courts still require a showing of actual prejudice. See, e.g., United States v.
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None of the four Barker factors is dispositive of a denial of the right to a
speedy trial; rather, the test is suggestive as opposed to exhaustive. 32 Courts

have repeatedly stressed that the right to a speedy trial is, by its nature,
relative, which compels analysis of speedy trial questions in light of the circumstances of each particular case.3 3 The four-part test set forth in Barker
is the standard by which all recent speedy trial claims have been analyzed.3 4
According to common law precedent as well as the explicit wording of the
DeClue, 899 F.2d 1465, 1470-71 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant must show substantial
prejudice); Russell v. Lynaugh, 892 F.2d 1205, 1216 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that defendant
must show prejudice); Burmingham, 788 F.2d at 936 (stating that absence of showing of prejudice is decisive); United States v. Beidler, 417 F. Supp. 608, 618 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (holding that
actual prejudice must be established to show denial of right to speedy trial); Dan Donovan et
al., Speedy Trials: An Overview of the ConstitutionalRight and the Federaland Texas Statutes,
10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1043, 1048 (1979) (noting prejudice factor of Barker balancing test); H.
Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a FastShuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1376,
1388 (1972) (discussing defendant's assertion of right to speedy trial as factor in Barker
analysis).
32. Barker,407 U.S. at 533. Justice Powell noted that none of the factors possessed "talismanic" qualities; thus, by its nature, the test required courts to engage in a balancing process.
Id.; see also Hutchison v. Marshall, 744 F.2d 44, 48 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding lower court
decision that one of four factors by itself does not prove existence of speedy trial issue), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1221 (1985); United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1110 (5th Cir. 1976)
(finding other factors to be used in analysis implicit in Barker test); Turner v. Estelle, 515 F.2d
853, 855 (5th Cir.) (stating that nature of speedy trial right requires consideration on ad hoc
basis), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976); Dan Donovan et al., Speedy Trials: An Overview of
the ConstitutionalRight and the Federal and Texas Statutes, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1043,
1049 (1979) (arguing that no one factor of Barker test is sufficient to prove denial of right to
speedy trial); H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1383 (1972) (stating that factors should be balanced on ad hoc basis).
33. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 325 (holding that courts must make speedy trial judgments
on facts of each case); Ewell, 383 U.S. at 120 (stating that whether violation of speedy trial
right occurred depends on circumstances of individual case); Beavers, 198 U.S. at 87 (holding
facts of each case controlling); Wallace v. Kern, 499 F.2d 1345, 1351 (2d Cir.) (arguing that
circumstances of particular case play important part in determining if defendant's right to
speedy trial denied), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975); Evans v. United States, 397 F.2d 675,
676 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (finding right to speedy trial relative), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 907 (1969);
Palmer v. Judge & Dist. Attorney Gen. of the Thirteenth Judicial Dist. of Tenn., 411 F. Supp.
1029, 1034 (W.D. Tenn. 1976) (stating that analysis of speedy trial issue depends on circumstances); Sander v. Ohio, 365 F. Supp. 1251, 1253 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (stating that speedy trial
claims must be considered on case-by-case basis), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir.), and cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974); State v. Bailey, 572 A.2d 544, 554 (Md. 1990) (holding that
determination of speedy trial question depends on facts); Dan Donovan et al., Speedy Trials:
An Overview of the ConstitutionalRight and the Federaland Texas Statutes, 10 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1043, 1048 (1979) (determining that factors of Barker test must be considered in light of
each individual case); Gary A. Winters, Project, Preliminary Proceedings--Speedy Trial, 79
GEO. L.J. 591, 867 (1991) (stating that Barker test compels courts to evaluate speedy trial
claims on ad hoc basis).
34. Doggett v. United States, - U.S. __ 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 528
(1992).
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Sixth Amendment, the right to a speedy trial does not become available to
an individual until he becomes "an accused.", 35 Only formal indictment, information, or actual restraint imposed by arrest will activate the protection
of the Speedy Trial Clause36 because, until arrest or indictment takes place,
the defendant suffers no restraint on his liberty." Although the Speedy
Trial Clause applies only to post-accusation delays, defendants are afforded
protection from pre-accusation delays by the relevant statutes of limitation.3" Because statutes of limitation often do not comprehensively protect a

35. Marion, 404 U.S. at 313; see State v. Cowger, 581 So. 2d 283, 286 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(attaching speedy trial right when defendant accused); Wiley v. State, 582 So. 2d 1008, 1011
(Miss. 1991) (finding that constitutional right to speedy trial attaches once defendant accused);
Galloway v. State, 574 So. 2d 1, 2 (Miss. 1990) (stating that right to speedy trial attaches at
time defendant accused); see also Paul R. Clevenger, Note, Narrowing the Scope of the Speedy
TrialRight: U.S. v. MacDonald, 36 Sw. L.J. 1213, 1215-20 (1983) (discussing courts' determinations of when right to speedy trial attaches); Nancy N. Kerr, Note, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 113,
117-20 (1982) (discussing when clock begins to run for speedy trial purposes).
36. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1987) (stating that Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial attaches when formal charges brought and/or prosecution begins);
Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975) (finding that right to speedy trial attaches
at arrest); Marion, 404 U.S. at 313 (equating indictment with accusation for speedy trial purposes); Redd v. Sowders, 809 F.2d 1266, 1269 (6th Cir. 1987) (triggering speedy trial clock at
indictment or arrest, whichever is earlier); United States v. Feinberg, 383 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir.
1967) (holding right to speedy trial available after arrest); Wheeler v. State, 596 A.2d 78, 81
(Md. 1991) (opining that arrest or formal charges, whichever first, activates Sixth Amendment
right to speedy trial); Osborne v. State, 806 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo. 1991) (activating speedy trial
right upon arrest or filing of indictment); Gary A. Winters, Project, PreliminaryProceedingsSpeedy Trial, 79 GEO. L.J. 591, 866 (1991) (stating that Sixth Amendment protects defendant's speedy trial right after arrest or indictment). But see Alan N. Schneider, Note, The Right
to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476, 482 (1968) (stating that speedy trial right need not be
implemented by indictment or information).
37. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 321 (finding no speedy trial violation when government knew
of crime but waited three years to deliver indictment). Justice White stressed that until an
individual is arrested or held to answer for a crime, he suffers no restraint on his lifestyle and is
not subject to public accusation. Id.; see also United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312
(1986) (holding that Sixth Amendment does not attach when defendant arrested and released
since charges dropped and no bail imposed); MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 5-6 (finding no speedy
trial violation when defendant indicted in federal court four years after identical charges
dropped in military court); United States v. Fuesting, 845 F.2d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that no speedy trial violation found if defendant not subject to incarceration or bail); Gary
A. Winters, Project, Preliminary Proceedings--Speedy Trial, 79 GEO. L.J. 591, 866 (1991)
(noting that speedy trial right attaches at either arrest or indictment); Paul R. Clevenger, Note,
Narrowing the Scope of the Speedy Trial Right: U.S. v. MacDonald, 36 Sw. L.J. 1213, 1215
(1983) (noting that formal indictment or arrest triggers speedy trial clause).
38. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 322 (arguing that statutes of limitation guard against preaccusation delays that might result in prejudice to defendant's case); Ewell, 383 U.S. at 122
(finding statute of limitation primary guarantee against pre-accusation delay); United States v.
Zane, 489 F.2d 269, 270 n. 1 (5th Cir.) (opining. that statute of limitation is primary form of
protection against pre-accusation delay), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1973); United States v.
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defendant from oppressive delay, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment also plays a significant role in protecting defendants from undue pre-accusation delays in prosecution. 39 The Due Process Clause may, in
fact, require the dismissal of charges, provided the defendant shows that the

pre-indictment or pre-arrest delay caused him actual prejudice. 4° Historically, the defendant claiming a speedy trial violation could find recourse
through the Due Process Clause only in situations of pre-accusation delay. 4 I
However, the Due Process Clause, by its design, serves to prevent any unfair
or unjust treatment by the Government and could theoretically also apply to

post-accusation delays.4 2

Grayson, 416 F.2d 1073, 1076 (5th Cir.) (finding that interval between date of offense and date
of prosecution relates to statute of limitations), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1059 (1969); Gary A.
Winters, Project, Preliminary Proceedings-Speedy Trial, 79 GEO. L.J. 591, 864 (1991) (discussing statute of limitation as means of protecting against pre-trial delay); Nancy N. Kerr,
Note, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 113, 118 (1982) (noting statute of limitation's role in protecting
against pre-indictment delay).
39. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1977) (arguing that Due Process
Clause provides protection from excessive pre-trial delay); Marion, 404 U.S. at 324 (finding
that Due Process Clause could require dismissal if pre-trial delay impaired defendant's right to
fair trial); Fuesting, 845 F.2d at 669 (stating that protection from pre-accusation delay must
come from Due Process Clause); United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir.) (reasoning that relief from pre-indictment delay afforded by Due Process Clause), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 854 (1976); Nancy N. Kerr, Note, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 113, 118 (1982) (pointing out that
Due Process Clause guards against pre-indictment delay); Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 861 (1957) (noting that Due Process Clause has role in
protecting against speedy trial violations).
40. See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789 (requiring proof of actual prejudice to defendant and
departure from justice on part of prosecution to establish due process claim); Marion, 404 U.S.
at 324 (entitling defendant to dismissal on due process grounds if he proves substantial prejudice or intentional action by Government to gain tactical advantage); United States v. MacClain, 501 F.2d 1006, 1010 (10th Cir. 1974) (finding no violation of due process without
showing of actual prejudice or governmental foul play); United States v. Gambale, 610 F.
Supp. 1515, 1549 (D. Mass. 1985) (requiring that defendant show actual prejudice from delay
or that actions of Government violate fundamental concepts of justice in order to claim denial
of due process); LORD DENNING, THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW 93 (London, Butterworths
1980) (arguing that dismissal requires inordinate delay causing serious prejudice); Nancy N.
Kerr, Note, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 113, 118 (1982) (noting that dismissal on due process grounds
mandates showing actual prejudice).
41. See Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788 (1977) (explaining that Due Process Clause provides
protection from delays prior to arrest or indictment); Marion, 404 U.S. at 324 (reasoning that
Due Process Clause protects defendant's rights regarding events prior to indictment); Simmons, 536 F.2d at 830 (pointing out that due process provides defendants with remedy in case
of prosecutorial delay in pre-indictment stage); Gary A. Winters, Project, PreliminaryProceedings-Speedy Trial, 79 GEO. L.J. 591, 866-70 (1991) (noting that Due Process Clause provides
constitutional safeguard against pre-accusation delay); Nancy N. Kerr, Note, 14 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 113, 118 (1982) (stating that delays preceding arrest are protected against by Due Process
Clause).
42. See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (stating that due pro-
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Justice Souter, in writing for the majority, began his analysis of United
States v. Doggett with the Barker test in mind.43 Justice Souter acknowledged that the first Barker element, length of delay, is a triggering mechanism as well as an important element in the analysis.' Justice Souter
established that the Barker test was the appropriate test analyzing Doggett
because the eight and one-half year lag between Doggett's indictment and
arrest was more than sufficient to trigger the Barker analysis.4 5 After determining the proper analysis, Justice Souter turned to the second criterion of
the Barker test, the reason for the delay.4 6 Justice Souter conceded that,
according to established speedy trial standards, pre-trial delay is often inevitable and, as such, is entirely justifiable.4 7 In light of these established standards, Justice Souter concluded that, had the Government pursued Doggett
with due diligence from the time of indictment to the time of arrest, Doggett
could not have claimed a violation of his right to a speedy trial unless he
could have positively proven that his defense had been prejudiced by the
delay.4" However, Justice Souter gave great deference to the district court's
determination that the Government had been negligent in its handling of the
Doggett case.49 Justice Souter established that negligence in prosecution falls
somewhere between diligence in prosecution and a bad faith delay, and that,
although negligent delay does not automatically mandate relief for the defendant, a delay as extensive as that in the present case should not be tolerated. 50 Justice Souter argued that a court's tolerance for governmental
cess comes into play when governmental activity violates protected right of defendant); Bloom
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 195 (1968) (stating that Due Process Clause forbids federal government from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (arguing that governmental fair play is essence of due
process); United States v. La Monica, 472 F.2d 580, 581 (9th Cir. 1972) (reasoning that Due
Process Clause is intended to protect individuals from governmental over-reaching). See generally Lucius POLK MCGEHEE, DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1906) (describing guarantees of Due Process Clause); RODNEY L. Mo'rr, DUE PROCESS
OF LAW (1973) (analyzing historical use of Due Process Clause).
43. Doggett v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520,
528 (1992). The Barker test limits the broad language of the Clause and establishes a workable
standard for dealing with speedy trial issues. See id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, for proposition that case law limits broad reach of Speedy Trial Clause).
44. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2690, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 528.
45. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2691, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 528.
46. Id.
47. Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2693, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 531. Justice Souter noted
that the Government often needs time to locate and prepare witnesses, respond to pre-trial
motions, and track down fugitive defendants. Id.
48. Id. at .,112
S. Ct. at 2693, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 529.
49. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2691, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 528-29. Justice Souter commented that,
had the Government made any serious effort to locate Doggett during the six years he was
living in the United States, it would have found him in minutes. Id.
50. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2693, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 531.
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negligence in prosecution should be inversely related to the length of the
delay. 5 '
Continuing his application of the Barker criteria to the facts in the case at
hand, Justice Souter rejected the Government's contention that, because
Doggett failed to assert his right to a speedy trial, the third element of the
Barker test should weigh heavily against him.5 2 The majority strongly reiterated the lower court's finding that Doggett was unaware of his indictment
until the time of his arrest.13 Therefore, according to Justice Souter, Doggett could
not be penalized for his delay in asserting his right to a speedy
54
trial.
In addressing the final element of the Barker test, Justice Souter pointed
out that courts in prior relevant cases have established certain purposes for
the Speedy Trial Clause.55 In particular, Justice Souter identified prejudice
to the defendant's trial as the most serious concern. 56 Justice Souter stressed
that, once the prosecutorial process has been triggered by arrest or formal
accusation, a court faced with a speedy trial inquiry must consider the effect
of any delay on the defendant's ability adequately to defend himself.57 In
response to the Government's claim that Doggett had failed conclusively to
establish prejudice to his defense by the delay, Justice Souter declared that
affirmative proof of prejudice is not necessary. 5" Establishing the impair51. Doggett, - U.S. at -_, 112 S. Ct. at 2693, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 531. Prejudice to defense
increases as the delay increases, and when there is no compelling reason for the delay, the
defendant should not suffer for the Government's negligence. Id. Unjustified delays indicate a
lack of interest in prosecuting the defendant; therefore, the Government should have little
complaint with the dismissal of the case on speedy trial grounds. Id.
52. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2691, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 529-30.
53. Id. The Government had introduced no evidence at Doggett's speedy trial hearing
that would contradict the testimony of Doggett's mother and wife, who both stated that Doggett was unaware of the indictment. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2691, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 529.
Justice Souter also quoted from the record of the hearing in which the Government conceded
the point, stating that it had "no information that Doggett was aware of the indictment...
prior to his arrest." Id.
54. Id.
55. Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2692, 120 L. Ed. 2d 532. Justice Souter relied on
Barker to reiterate the purposes of speedy trial guarantee, Smith v. Hooey to describe what the
speedy trial was intended to protect against, and Ewell to establish the purposes of the Speedy
Trial Clause. Id. These cases explain that the Speedy Trial Clause protects against: 1) undue
incarceration; 2) the anxiety associated with awaiting trial; and 3) prejudice to the defendant's
trial. Id.
56. Id. Prejudice to the defendant is the most serious concern of the Speedy Trial Clause
"because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the
entire system". Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
57. Id.
58. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2692, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 530. Justice Souter did acknowledge,
however, that Doggett had failed to demonstrate that the delay in his arrest led to any deficiency in his ability to defend himself at trial. Id.
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ment of an accused's defense is an extremely onerous burden because it is
difficult, if not impossible, to prove the loss of valuable testimony or evidence.59 Because of this difficulty in making an affirmative showing of prejudice, Justice Souter established that an excessive delay creates a presumption
of prejudice which becomes stronger as the length of the delay increases."
The majority opinion concluded by stipulating that the presumption of prejudice created by the delay of eight and one-half years between Doggett's
indictment and his trial, coupled with the Government's negligence in prosecuting the case, entitled Doggett to relief under the Sixth Amendment.6 1
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's use of the
Barker test in its analysis of Doggett; however, the Justice took issue with the
majority's liberal application of the fourth element of the test.62 According
to Justice O'Connor, the defendant should be required to show actual prejudice to his defense before such prejudice is considered in the Barker analysis." Relying on language in United States v. Loud Hawk,' Justice
O'Connor concluded that speculative harm, and the possibility of prejudice,
should not be sufficient to support a contention that a speedy trial violation
has occurred.6 5
In a strong dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, questioned the applicability of the Barker test in situations
where the defendant is unaware of the indictment prior to arrest.6 6 Justice
Thomas insisted that during the eight and one-half years between Doggett's
indictment and arrest, he suffered none of the abuses against which the
Speedy Trial Clause was directed. 67 The Justice rejected the majority's contention that prejudice against a defendant's ability to defend himself at trial
is an independent and fundamental concern of the Speedy Trial Clause.68

59. Doggett,

-

U.S. at -.
, 112 S. Ct. at 2692-93, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 530-31.

60. Id. at - ,112 S. Ct. at 2693, 120 L. Ed. at 531. Justice Souter noted that the presumption of prejudice must be taken together with the other Barker criteria as a mix of relevant facts and could not be considered exclusively. Id.
61. Id. at __ 112 S. Ct. at 2694, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 532 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

62. Id.
63. Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2694, 210 L. Ed. 2d at 532 (O'Connor J.,
dissenting).
64. 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986).
65. Doggett, - U.S. at , 112 S.Ct. at 2694, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor reasoned that such a standard would not be overly burdensome to the
defendant as lengthy pre-trial delay is a "two-edged sword." Id. Given that the Government
has the burden of proof, excessive delay will increase the likelihood that the Government will
not be able to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant will be exonerated. Id.
66. Id.at __ 112 S.Ct. at 2695, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 533 (Thomas J., dissenting).

67. Id.
68. Id.
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Relying on United States v. Marion,6 9 Justice Thomas emphasized that the
"major evils" which the Speedy Trial Clause was designed to prevent
were
oppressive incarceration and anxiety accompanying public accusation.7"
The Justice categorized these major concerns as obstructions of liberty.7
While Justice Thomas acknowledged that a lengthy pre-trial delay may affect the defendant in any number of ways,7 2 the Justice pointed out that the
Speedy Trial Clause is tailored not to prevent all injurious effects but to prevent any effects that restrict the defendant's liberty.7 3 Justice Thomas explained that statutes of limitation and the Due Process Clause are the
appropriate recourses for an individual who believes that his defense has
been impaired by governmental delay in the post-accusation prosecution of
his case.74
Justice Thomas noted that there was a divergence of opinion on the issue
of whether prejudice to the defense is an independent concern of the speedy
trial guarantee. 75 However, he was quick to point out that the language in
Barker, which suggests that the prevention of prejudice to the defense is a
major concern of the Speedy Trial Clause, is merely dictum. 76 The facts in
Doggett were so unusual that Justice Thomas believed they could not have
been contemplated by the Court when making previous decisions.77 Never,
explained Justice Thomas, had there been a case before the Court in which a
defendant who was subjected to lengthy pre-trial delay suffered no restrictions on his liberty.78
In concluding his dissent, Justice Thomas retained the long-standing requisite that each speedy trial analysis must be made according to the individual circumstances of that case.79 With this consideration in mind, Justice

69. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
70. Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2695, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 533 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas went on to say that neither of the "major" concerns of the clause were
implicated in the present case. Id. Doggett was certainly not incarcerated, and he suffered no
pre-trial anxiety as he was unaware of his indictment until the time of his arrest. Id.
71. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2695, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 534 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at
112 S. Ct. at 2695, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 535 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1'
73. Id.
74. Doggett, - U. S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2698, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 537 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stressed that the primary purpose of the Due Process Clause is to protect individuals from unfair treatment in criminal prosecutions. Id.
75. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2696, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 535 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas compared Marion, McDonald, and Loud Hawk, all cases requiring a restriction on
liberty before a speedy trial issue may be raised, with Barker, Smith, and Ewell, all cases
deeming prejudice to the defense to be an independent concern of the Speedy Trial Clause. Id.
76. Id. at __,112 S. Ct. at 2696, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 536 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at .. ,112 S. Ct. at 2695, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 536 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
78. Doggett, - U.S. at - 112 S. Ct. at 2695, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 536 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
79. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2700, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 540 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Thomas argued that the Barker test should not be used as a blanket analysis
of all speedy trial claims; rather, it should be used only in situations involving a restriction of liberty."0 According to Justice Thomas, although Doggett was subjected to an extraordinary pre-trial delay, he suffered no
restrictions on his liberty from that delay; therefore, his right to a speedy
trial was not at issue, and the Barker test should not apply."
In Doggett, the Court applied the Barker test with little regard for the
unusual circumstances of the case.8 2 In so doing, the Court lost sight of the
character and intention of the right to a speedy trial as established in the
Sixth Amendment and as developed through precedent.8 3 There is no evidence in the centuries preceding the enactment of the Bill of Rights that the
80. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2700, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 539 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas feared that the Barker test had "taken on a life of its own" instead of being used a tool
in the determination of whether an individual had been deprived of a liberty protected by the
speedy trial guarantee. Id. Justice Thomas went on to say that the Barker test itself had been
used by the majority to bestow new liberties on defendants. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905) (recognizing that determining whether
delay involved in criminal prosecution violates defendant's right to speedy trial depends on
circumstances of case). The Beavers Court stated, "The right to a speedy trial is necessarily
relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a
defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice." Id.; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (holding that each speedy trial question must be answered based upon its
own set of circumstances); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (stating that right
to speedy trial is relative); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957) (emphasizing that
whether delay in completing prosecution amounts to deprivation of speedy trial right depends
upon circumstances). The right to a speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights, and it is impossible to determine with any precision when the right has been
denied. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522. What length of delay will be considered a violation of the
speedy trial right depends on facts of each individual case, and length considered is directly
proportional to the complexities of the case. State v. Hefferman, 809 P.2d 566, 568 (Mont.
1991); see also Dan Donovan et al., Speedy Trials: An Overview of the ConstitutionalRight and
the Federaland Texas Statutes, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1043, 1048 (1979) (weighing factors of
Barker test must be done in light of circumstances in each case); Gary A. Winters, Project,
PreliminaryProceedings-Speedy Trial, 79 GEO. L.J. 591, 867 (1991) (stating that Barker test
compels courts to evaluate speedy trial claims on ad hoc basis).
83. See Doggett v. United States, -

U.S.

-,

-,

112 S.Ct. 2686, 2700, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520,

539 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating, "So engrossed is the Court in applying the.., test
set forth in Barker that it loses sight of the nature and purpose of the speedy trial guarantee
). Justice
....Thomas noted the long-established standard of evaluating speedy trial issues on
a case-by-case basis. Id.; see Beavers, 198 U.S. at 87 (recognizing for first time that evaluation
of speedy trial claim is contextual inquiry). The Barker test was established as a means to give
the necessarily contextual analysis of alleged speedy trial violations some form of structure, not
as an end in itself. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 (establishing Barker test as mechanism to be
used in analysis of speedy trial issues); see also Dan Donovan et al., Speedy Trials: An Overview
of the ConstitutionalRight and the Federaland Texas Statutes, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1043,

1048 (1979) (stating that factors of Barker test must be considered in light of individual case);
Gary A. Winters, Project, Preliminary Proceedings-Speedy Trial, 79 GEO. L.J. 591, 867
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right to a speedy trial was triggered until a defendant was arrested and held
to answer for a criminal offense, at which point his liberty was actually restricted. 4 Moreover, there is no suggestion that there was any intention on
the part of the authors of the Bill of Rights to depart from the practiced
understanding of the British right to a speedy trial.8 5 With this historical

(1991) (concluding that Barker test compels courts to evaluate speedy trial claims on ad hoc
basis).
84. See SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF
ENGLAND ch. xxvi at 43 (David S. Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thorne, eds., Garland Publishing,
Inc. 1979) (providing commentary on Chapter 40 of Magna Charta). Sir Edward Coke stated,
"Justices of... Gaole delivery came at the least into every county twice every year; ... and...
the Justices ...have not suffered the prisoners to be long detained, but at their next coming
have given the prisoner full and speedy justice .... Id.; see Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213, 223-24 (1967) (discussing Chapter 40 of the Magna Charta in reference to modem
speedy trial concerns); United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 196 (D. Md.), aff'd, 350 U.S.
857 (1955) (discussing Magna Charta in reference to modem speedy trial concerns); Natalia
Nicolaidis, The Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy and Public Trial, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1489, 1489-90 (1989) (discussing British history of right to speedy trial). Because this command was directed to the justices, and not to the sheriff, it is clear that the command was only
to have effect in situations wherein the prisoner was being held. See SIR EDWARD COKE, THE
SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND ch. xxvi at 46 (David S.

Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thorne, eds., Garland Publishing, Inc. 1979). The role of the justices
was to provide speedy adjudication, not to apprehend and arrest alleged wrongdoers; thus, the
Magna Charta's provision requiring expedition on the part of only the justices suggests that
the speedy trial right was directed only to delays occurring after arrest. See 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at *318-19 (discussing procedures sheriffs used to apprehend
criminals). Additionally, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 definitively states that the purpose of
the Act was to deal exclusively with those already arrested: "Whereas great delays have been
used by sheriffs and other officers, to whose custody any of the King's subjects have been
committed for criminal or supposed criminal matters ....whereby many of the King's subjects
have been and hereafter may be long detained in prison." Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, reprinted in 1 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 124-31 (2d series 1982); see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 314 n.6
(1971) (noting that Habeas Corpus Act did not allude to delays preceding arrest). According
to William Blackstone in his commentary on the right to a speedy trial, the same understanding of the right prevailed in the eighteenth century. 4 WILLIAM

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-

*351. Blackstone noted, "It is usual to try all felons immediately, or soon after their
arraignment." Id. That assertion by design applied only to those already arrested, because an
arraignment could not occur unless the criminal was already in custody. Id. at *317.
RIES

85. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 934 (1833) (tracing events up to ratification of Constitution). Virginia's 1776 Declara-

tion of Rights provided, "[I]n all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to a
speedy trial." VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 8, reprintedin 10 WILLIAM F.
SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 48-50 (1979).
Article 8 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights may have been the foundation used by the

framers of the Constitution in drafting the Sixth Amendment. Marion, 404 U.S. at 314 n.6.
Several other states ratified analogous provisions. E.g., MARYLAND DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS of 1776, art. 19, reprinted in 4 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS
OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 373 (1975) (stating that ". . . every man hath a right to a
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mandate in mind, courts have limited the application of the Speedy Trial
Clause to situations in which the defendant has been held to answer on criminal charges86 because until the defendant's liberty is restricted, none of the
traditional concerns of the speedy trial guarantee is implicated.8 7

speedy trial"); PENNSYLVANIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 9 reprinted in 8 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 278-79
(1979) (also stating that "... . a man hath a right to ... a speedy public trial"); see also Klopfer,

386 U.S. at 225-26 n.21 (listing various speedy trial provisions in constitutions of states of new
nation). The British protections, used by the states as a basis for these provisions, did not deal
with periods before arrest. See Magna Charta, ch. 40 (1215), quoted in FREDERICK POLLACK
& FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 172 (2d ed. 1898); Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679, reprinted in 1 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 124-25 (2d series 1982). Records of the First Congress show
only one passage discussing the Speedy Trial Clause, while there are records of extensive debate on other provisions contained in the Bill of Rights. See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

31 (1951) (discussing limited

records of debate); Alan L. Schneider, Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV.
476, 484 (discussing debate). The debate centered around the belief of certain congressmen
that the speedy trial problem would be adequately addressed by the Compulsory Process
Clause or through judicial regulation. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 756 (Joseph Gales, ed., 1789).
The proposed revision was rejected. Id. There was no mention during the enactment of the
Bill of Rights that the Speedy Trial Clause should differ in form or in scope from its British
counterparts. Id.
86. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1982) (attaching right to speedy
trial when formal charges are brought or when prosecution begins). As far as speedy trial
claims are concerned, a pre-indictment delay is irrelevant since only formal indictment or
actual restraint imposed by arrest triggers the protection of the clause. United States v.
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1977). It is either formal indictment or information, or actual
arrest and holding to answer on a criminal charge, that engages the protection of the Sixth
Amendment's right to a speedy trial. Marion, 404 U.S. at 313; cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 310 (1966) (noting that "there is no constitutional right to be arrested"). The Court
in Hoffa stated, "The police are not required to guess, at their peril, the precise moment at
which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, or a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait too long." Id.
Further, the Speedy Trial Act augments the significance placed on the defendant's being held
to answer before the speedy trial right attaches. See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (c)(1)
(1989) (providing that statutory clock would run from date of indictment or date that "the
defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending,
whichever date occurs last"). In other words, the statutory speedy trial guarantee is not activated until the defendant has been held to answer for his crime. Id. In passing the Speedy
Trial Act, Congress sought to "make effective the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial."
See S. REP. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974) (providing evidence of congressional intent
in passing the Act). The same result is reached under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
48(b). See Marion, 404 U.S. at 319 (stating that rule 48(b) "is clearly limited to post-arrest
situations").
87. See Ewell, 383 U.S. at 120 (outlining purposes of Speedy Trial Clause). The Supreme
Court pointed out that the Speedy Trial Clause is "an important safeguard to prevent undue
and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying
public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an
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As the majority correctly points out, the delay of eight and one-half years

between Doggett's indictment and trial was extraordinarily long. 8

How-

ever, what is paramount in assessing the delay in this particular case is that
Doggett was not aware of the indictment against him until the day of his
arrest.8 " The situation of the defendant who is unaware of the charges

accused to defend himself." Id. However, in later cases, the Court identified the "major evils"
against which the clause protects as undue and oppressive incarceration and anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation, noticeably omitting impairment to the accused's defense. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 311 (1986) (discussing core concerns of
Speedy Trial Clause). In Loud Hawk, the court reasoned:
The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration
prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by
arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.
Id.; see also Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 (considering purposes for Sixth Amendment's speedy trial
provision). The Court, in Marion, acknowledged that a third concern of the Speedy Trial
Clause is to limit the possibilities that a delay will hamper a defendant's ability to properly
defend himself. Id. However, the Court went on to explain that impairment of defense was
not a major evil addressed by the clause, and thus, taken alone, is insufficient to warrant an
extension of the clause's reach. Id. at 321-323; see also Gary A. Winters, Project, Preliminary
Proceedings-SpeedyTrial, 79 GEO. L.J. 591, 864-79 (1991) (describing purpose of speedy trial
guarantee). When a defendant is not subject to such restraints as incarceration, impairment of
liberty accompanying bail, or disruption of life due to arrest, the Sixth Amendment is not
implicated. Id. at 866-67. But see Barker,407 U.S. at 532 (prejudice to defense is most serious
concern of Speedy Trial Clause); Daniel Brown, Note, Meshell v. State: The Death of Texas
Speedy Trial?, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 351-53 (1989) (describing prejudice to defense as
perhaps most important concern of Speedy Trial Clause).
88. See Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2694, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 532 (noting that "we
have called shorter delays extraordinary"); Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 (calling five-year delay
between arrest and trial "extraordinary"); Ricon v. Garrison, 517 F.2d 628, 632-33 (4th Cir.)
(finding 36-month delay sufficiently "unusual" to act as catalyst into inquiry of speedy trial
violation), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975); United States v. Calloway, 505 F.2d 311, 316
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that delay of more than one year raises speedy trial claim of prima
facie merit under Sixth Amendment). Lower courts have established that any post-accusation
delay approaching a year is sufficient to warrant a speedy trial inquiry. See 2 WAYNE LAFAVE
& JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.2, at 405 (1984) (describing procedure used

for raising speedy trial claim); Gregory P.N. Joseph, Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48
FORDHAM L. REVIEW 611, 623 (1980) (describing when inquiry into speedy trial may generally take place). But see Barber v. Hendrick, 315 F. Supp. 798, 800-01 (E.D. Penn. 1970)
(reasoning that 14-month delay was not so substantial as to warrant prima facie violation of
clause).
89. See Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2691, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 529 (pointing out that
Government presented "no information that Doggett was aware of the indictment before he
left the U.S., or prior to his arrest"). The Doggett Court noted that the "Barker test does not
apply at all ...when an accused is entirely unaware of pending indictment against him." Id.
at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2700, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 540; see also United States v. Redmond, 546 F.2d
1386, 1388-89 (10th Cir. 1977) (finding no denial of speedy trial where delay due to defendant
being out of country and aware of charges); United States v. Agreda, 612 F. Supp. 153, 158
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (no speedy trial violation when defendant was in Venezuela while govern-
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against him is clearly distinguishable from that of a defendant who has been
arrested or held to answer. 90 Doggett was not deprived of liberty or otherwise subject to restraint during the period of delay; consequently, he was in
the same position he would have been in had the indictment been returned
shortly before his arrest. 91 Under those circumstances, the speedy trial guar-

ment attempted to locate and apprehend him). It is important to note that had Doggett been
aware of the charges against him, his Sixth Amendment claim would most certainly have been
weakened because of his delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial. See Barker, 407 U.S. at
532 (stating "[W]e emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial."). Although a defendant's assertion of his right
to a speedy trial is only a factor to be weighed into the analysis, the ultimate impact "depends
on efforts made by the accused." Sam H. Clinton, Speedy Trial-Texas Style, 33 BAYLOR L.
REV. 707, 717 (1981); see also Nancy N. Kerr, Note, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 113, 116 (1982)
(finding that courts have required defendant to demand trial in order to later claim speedy trial
violation).
90. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 321 (declining to extend reach of amendment to period prior
to arrest). In such a situation the defendant suffers neither restraint due to arrest or bond, nor
the anxiety and humiliation accompanying pending charges. See id. at 319-26 (stating that
protections of Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial are not engaged until accused has suffered some deprivation of liberty). If a defendant is unaware of charges against him, he certainly suffers no incarceration and there can be no anxiety or concern generated by public
accusation. Paul R. Clevenger, Note, Narrowing the Scope of the Speedy Trial Right U.S. v.
MacDonald, 36 Sw. L.J. 1213, 1215 (1983); cf. LEWIS R. KATZ, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME:
PRE-TRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CASES 56-59 (1972) (discussing repercussions of pre-trial delays on defendants); C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Speedy Trial-DelayBefore Arrest, 85 A.L.R.
2D 981, 986 (1962) (citing cases in which defendant was not aware of indictment against him).
A helpful illustration of the contention that an inquiry into a pre-trial delay depends on the
defendant's circumstances is the situation in which a defendant avoids arrest after being indicted-such a defendant is not protected under the Sixth Amendment. See United States v.
DeLeon, 710 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding no denial of right to speedy trial where
delay was result of defendant's fugitive status); United States v. Tarrack, 515 F.2d 558, 559
(9th Cir. 1975) (holding that delay caused by defendant's evasion of capture did not give rise to
denial of right to speedy trial); United States v. Weber, 479 F.2d 331, 333 (8th Cir. 1973)
(finding no denial of speedy trial right where defendant was fugitive from justice).
91. See Halcomb v. Eckle, 165 N.E.2d 479, 480-81 (Ohio 1959) (reasoning that three-year
lapse between indictment and trial did not constitute speedy trial violation because defendant
did not suffer oppression). The Ohio Supreme Court explained that the defendant was not in
jail or on bail between the complaint and the arrest, and thus, according to the principle that
the right to speedy trial was designed to prevent unjust oppression, the defendant was not
denied his right to speedy trial. Id. Delay between indictment and arrest should not be considered in determining whether a defendant's right to speedy trial has been denied where none
of the interests protected by the amendment's guarantee were effected during the delay. See
United States v. Williams, 782 F.2d 1462, 1465-66 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to speedy trial not violated where there was valid reason for delay and
defendant suffered no substantial impairments to his liberty); United States v. Hay, 527 F.2d
990, 994 (10th Cir.) (finding that delay did not equal violation of speedy trial), cert.denied,425
U.S. 935 (1975); Paul R. Clevenger, Note, Narrowingthe Scope of the Speedy Trial Right. U.S.
v. MacDonald, 36 Sw. L.J. 1213, 1220-23 (1983) (discussing courts' determination of when
right to speedy trial attaches); David M. Furr, Note, Right to a Speedy Trial in Civilian Prose-
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antee would not have been an issue, yet the effect of the delay on Doggett
would have been the same as under the present scenario. 92 Because Doggett
suffered no restriction of his liberty, he should not be entitled to the presumption of prejudice that would normally attend so long a delay. 93 Had

cution Denied by Delay FollowingDismissal of Military Charges: United States v. MacDonald,
17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 119 (1981) (arguing that speedy trial question not at issue when
defendant not subject to either arrest or indictment).
92. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 313 (noting that Sixth Amendment has no application until
defendant becomes accused). In Marion, the Court determined that although the Government
knew about the defendants' crime and their identities for over three years before they were
indicted, there was no Sixth Amendment violation because the clock does not begin to run on a
speedy trial claim until a defendant is either arrested or held to answer on criminal charges.
Id. at 311-13; cf Doggett - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2696, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 536 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that formal charge irrelevant as to whether defendant suffers prejudice).
Justice Thomas reasoned, "A defendant prosecuted ten years after a crime is just as hampered
in his ability to defend himself whether he was indicted the week after the crime or a week
before the trial-but no one would suggest that the Clause protects him in the latter situation."
Id.; see also Fritz v. State, 811 P.2d 1353, 1365 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (finding that time
lapse of five years between murder and indictment did not violate defendant's right to speedy
trial). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Court affirmed Marion, stating that the defendant became entitled to a speedy trial only when a felony information was filed. Fritz, 811
P.2d at 1365; cf. Paul R. Clevenger, Note, Narrowing the Scope of the Speedy Trial Right:
U.S. v. MacDonald, 36 Sw. L.J. 1213, 1223 (1983) (stating that when charges are dismissed,
defendant does not suffer any more anxiety or restraint on liberty than defendant who was
merely under investigation).
93. See Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2697, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 536 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (stating, "Never, until today, have we confronted a case where a defendant subjected to a lengthy delay after indictment nonetheless failed to suffer any substantial impairment of his liberty."). In dealing with questions of constitutional violation, the Court has
historically focused on the prejudice suffered by the defendant. See H. Richard Uviller, Barker
v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a FastShuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1392 (1972) (discussing
various forms of prejudice courts analyze when dealing with constitutional violations); see also
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873 (1982) (requiring showing of prejudice
to establish claim of compulsory process violation); United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361,
365 (1981) (requiring that prejudice be shown to claim violation of defendant's right to counsel); Lavasco, 431 U.S. at 790 (requiring proof of prejudice for dismissal due to pre-indictment
delay); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that suppression of evidence causing defendant prejudice violates due process). It follows that the same analysis applies to
speedy trial claims because in all the cases in which this Court has granted relief under the
Speedy Trial Clause, the defendant suffered some form of prejudice. See, e.g., Dillingham v.
United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64-65 (1975) (defendant subject to anxiety where arrest preceded
indictment by 22 months); Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1973) (defendant tried for
murder three years after charge subject to anxiety pending trial); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S.
374, 378 (1969) (defendant subject to prison detention pending trial); Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 222
(bailed defendant subject to public scorn while awaiting trial). Most lower court decisions
have stressed the need for defendants to prove actual prejudice as a result of pre-trial delay in
order to successfully claim a speedy trial violation. Dan Donovan et al., Speedy Trials: An
Overview of the ConstitutionalRight and the Federal and Texas Statutes, 10 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1043, 1057 (1979).
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the majority analyzed Doggett in terms of the effect of the delay, rather than
simply in terms of the length of delay, it should have been obvious that Doggett's situation raised no issues within the traditional scope of the Speedy
Trial Clause. 94 Given that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause protects individuals from such governmental over-reaching, Doggett was not
without recourse for the extraordinary delay in his arrest. 95 When a defendant is not subject to restraints on his freedom or the anxiety accompanying
knowledge of the existence of an indictment, the Sixth Amendment is not
implicated, and protection must come from due process guarantees. 96 The

94. See Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 312 (reasoning that core concern of Speedy Trial Clause
is impairment of liberty). In Loud Hawk, the district court twice dismissed an indictment
against the defendant. Id. at 305. The Government twice appealed the dismissals. Id. In
deciding whether the time in which the case was on appeal was to be counted for purposes of
the Speedy Trial Clause, the Court held that because the defendants were not subject to restraints on their liberty, their situation did not "warrant relief under the Speedy Trial Clause."
Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 311. The Loud Hawk Court stated, "When defendants are not incarcerated or subject to other substantial restrictions on their liberty, a court should not weigh
that time towards a claim under the Speedy Trial Clause." Id. at 312; see also MacDonald,456
U.S. at 9 (finding no denial of speedy trial right when defendant not restrained in any way).
The Court in MacDonald held that a five-year delay between dismissal of military charges and
filing of civilian charges should not be counted in determining pre-trial delay. Id. The court
explained, "MacDonald was not under arrest, not in custody... [h]e was free to go about his
affairs, to practice his profession, and to continue with his life." Id. at 10. See generally Paul
R. Clevenger, Note, Narrowing the Scope of the Speedy Trial Right: U.S. v. MacDonald, 36
Sw. L.J. 1213, 1220-23 (1983) (providing commentary on MacDonald); Nancy N. Kerr, Note,
14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 113, 118 (1982) (commenting on MacDonald). Because Doggett was not
incarcerated and suffered no restriction of his liberty, MacDonald and Loud Hawk suggest that
the period between his indictment and his arrest should be disregarded in calculating his
speedy trial claim. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 311; MacDonald,456 U.S. at 10; accord Doggett,
- U.S. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2693, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 535-536 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing
precedent established by Loud Hawk and MacDonald).
95. U.S. CONST., amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states, in part, that no person shall
"be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.; see also Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (stating that due process comes into play when government activity violates some protected right of defendant); Bloom v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S.
194, 195 (1968) (stating that Due Process Clause forbids federal government from depriving
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S.
522, 530 (1954) (reasoning that governmental fair play is essence of due process). See generally, Allyn Z. Lite, The Pre-Accusation Delay Dilemma, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 539, 540-45
(1980) (describing relationship between speedy trial analysis and Fifth Amendment). When a
delay violates "fundamental conceptions of justice" which define "the community's sense of
fair play and decency," a governmental delay in bringing a defendant to trial can violate the
Due Process Clause. David M. Furr, Note, Right to a Speedy Trial in Civilian Prosecution
Denied by Delay Following Dismissal of Military Charges: United States v. MacDonald, 17
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 118 (1981).
96. See MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8 (reasoning that "[t]he Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial is not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to defense caused by the passage of
time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause"); see also David M. Furr,
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majority in Doggett accurately applied the four Barker criteria to the facts of
the case. However, by so facilely applying the Barker analysis in a situation
where it was clearly unnecessary, the Court has wrenched the Barker test
from its role as a tool in the
determination of speedy trial violations and has
97
own.
its
of
life
a
it
given
By applying speedy trial analysis to a situation in which the defendant was
not in any way harmed by the delay between his indictment and arrest, the
Court has created a bright line standard for determining speedy trial violations which focuses solely on time. Such a standard presupposes that the
concerns of the Speedy Trial Clause have been implicated. However, it is
well-established that the analysis of a speedy trial claim is a contextual inquiry. The Barker test provides guidelines for assessing a speedy trial claim
only when it has been determined that the Speedy Trial Clause is at issue.
The Court has, in effect, turned the right to a speedy trial into a post-accusation statute of limitation. This transformation of the Speedy Trial Clause
encourages judicial paternalism by forcing courts to second-guess and oversee the government's prosecutorial efforts. Given that there is no constitu-

Note, Right to a Speedy Trial in Civilian Prosecution Denied by Delay Following Dismissal of
Military Charges: United States v. MacDonald, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 104-05 (1981)
(discussing role of Due Process Clause in guarding against unreasonable delays). In situations
of delay in which the concerns of the Speedy Trial Clause are not implicated, the Court has
directed defendants to the Due Process Clause for relief. See Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 312
(directing defendant to Due Process Clause as recourse for delay when right to speedy trial did
not attach); Marion, 404 U.S. at 324 (stating that defendant could find relief only through due
process protection because right to speedy trial not at issue); United States v. Wallace, 848
F.2d at 1464, 1469 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that speedy trial concerns not at issue when delay
may be reviewed by due process pre-accusation standard); United States v. Fuesting, 845 F.2d
664, 669 (7th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that if speedy trial concerns not implicated, defendant must
turn to Due Process Clause); see also Sam H. Clinton, Speedy Trial-TexasStyle, 33 BAYLOR
L. REV. 707, 717 (1981) (due process prevents dismissal of criminal proceedings due solely to
prosecution's lack of judgment in returning indictment).
97. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 (establishing Barker test to provide courts with guidance
in considering speedy trial claims). Courts have repeatedly stressed that the Barker test is to
be used as a means to an end when the particulars of a case lend themselves to the analysis.
See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (analyzing speedy trial
violation necessarily entails case-by-case consideration of all relevant factors, including Barker
criteria); United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1110 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding Barker test
suggestive rather then exhaustive); Handley v. State, 574 So. 2d 671, 676 (Miss. 1990) (determining speedy trial violation requires court to analyze each relevant factor, including but not
limited to Barker factors); State v. Van Voast, 805 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Mont. 1991) (stating that
each facet of Barker analysis to be considered in light of surrounding circumstances); Dan
Donovan et al., Speedy Trials: An Overview of the ConstitutionalRight and the Federal and
Texas Statutes, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1043, 1048 (1979) (stating that Barker test supplies
guidelines to courts on how to approach speedy trial issue); H. Richard Uviller, Barker v.
Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1381-82 (1972) (finding
that Barker test is not rigid, mechanical rule used to indicate speedy trial violation).
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tional or common law right to a speedy arrest, Doggett is at odds with
established concepts of constitutional jurisprudence.
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial serves to vindicate the rights
of individuals who have incurred impediments to their personal liberty because of governmental negligence in prosecution. Restriction of liberty is the
fundamental concern of the Speedy Trial Clause. Absent such prejudice, it
is difficult to justify the abolition of society's right to vindicate its interest in
punishing an admitted criminal.
Ronna A. Laidley
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